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Table of contents
THE CONQUEST OF THE VENEREAL DISEASES-8.1
THE CONQUEST OF THE VENEREAL DISEASES-8.2
THE CONQUEST OF THE VENEREAL DISEASES-8.3
THE CONQUEST OF THE VENEREAL DISEASES-8.4
THE CONQUEST OF THE VENEREAL DISEASES-8.5
THE CONQUEST OF THE VENEREAL DISEASES-8.6
FOOTNOTES
SEXUAL MORALITY-9.1
SEXUAL MORALITY-9.2
SEXUAL MORALITY-9.3
SEXUAL MORALITY-9.4
SEXUAL MORALITY-9.5
SEXUAL MORALITY-9.6
SEXUAL MORALITY-9.7
SEXUAL MORALITY-9.8
SEXUAL MORALITY-9.9
MARRIAGE-10.1
MARRIAGE-10.2
MARRIAGE-10.3
MARRIAGE-10.4
MARRIAGE-10.5
MARRIAGE-10.6
MARRIAGE-10.7
MARRIAGE-10.8
MARRIAGE-10.9
MARRIAGE-10.10
MARRIAGE-10.11
MARRIAGE-10.12
FOOTNOTES
THE ART OF LOVE-11.1
THE ART OF LOVE-11.2
THE ART OF LOVE-11.3
THE ART OF LOVE-11.4
THE ART OF LOVE-11.5
THE ART OF LOVE-11.6
THE ART OF LOVE-11.7
THE ART OF LOVE-11.8
THE ART OF LOVE-11.9
THE ART OF LOVE-11.10
THE ART OF LOVE-11.11
FOOTNOTES
THE SCIENCE OF PROCREATION-12.1
THE SCIENCE OF PROCREATION-12.2
THE SCIENCE OF PROCREATION-12.3
THE SCIENCE OF PROCREATION-12.4
THE SCIENCE OF PROCREATION-12.5
THE SCIENCE OF PROCREATION-12.6
THE SCIENCE OF PROCREATION-12.7
THE SCIENCE OF PROCREATION-12.8
THE SCIENCE OF PROCREATION-12.9
FOOTNOTES
INDEX OF AUTHORS

mutual agreement. In practice it is impossible to prevent more or less 

collusion, but if proved in court it constitutes an absolute impediment to 

the granting of a divorce, however just and imperative the demand for 

divorce may be. 

 

The English Divorce Act of 1857 refused divorce when there was 

collusion, as well as when there was any countercharge against 

the petitioner, and the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1860 provided 

the machinery for guaranteeing these bars to divorce. This 

question of collusion is discussed by G.P. Bishop (op. cit., 

vol. ii, Ch. IX). "However just a cause may be," Bishop remarks, 

"if parties collude in its management, so that in real fact both 

parties are plaintiffs, while by the record the one appears as 

plaintiff and the other as defendant, it cannot go forward. All 

conduct of this sort, disturbing to the course of justice, falls 

within the general idea of fraud on the court. Such is the 

doctrine in principle everywhere." 

 

It is quite evident that from the social or the moral point of view, it is 

best that when a husband and wife can no longer live together, they should 

part amicably, and in harmonious agreement effect all the arrangements 

rendered necessary by their separation. The law ridiculously forbids them 

to do so, and declares that they must not part at all unless they are 

willing to part as enemies. In order to reach a still lower depth of 

absurdity and immorality the law goes on to say that if as a matter of 

fact they have succeeded in becoming enemies to each other to such an 

extent that each has wrongs to plead against the other party they cannot 

be divorced at all![342] That is to say that when a married couple have 

reached a degree of separation which makes it imperatively necessary, not 

merely in their own interests but in the moral interests of society, that 

they should be separated and their relations to other parties concerned 

regularized, then they must on no account be separated. 

 

It is clear how these provisions of the law are totally opposed to the 

demands of reason and morality. Yet at the same time it is equally clear 

how no efforts of the lawyers, however skilful or humane those efforts may 

be, can bring the present law into harmony with the demands of modern 

civilization. It is not the lawyers who are at fault; they have done 

their best, and, in England, it is entirely owing to the skilful and 

cautious way in which the judges have so far as possible pressed the law 

into harmony with modern needs, that our antiquated divorce laws have 

survived at all. It is the system which is wrong. That system is the 

illegitimate outgrowth of the Canon law which grew up around conceptions 

long since dead. It involves the placing of the person who imperils the 

theoretical indissolubility of the matrimonial bond in the position of a 

criminal, now that he can no longer be publicly condemned as a sinner. To 

aid and abet that criminal is itself an offence, and the aider and abettor 

of the criminal must, therefore, be inconsequently punished by the curious 

method of refraining from punishing the criminal. We do not openly assert 

that the defendant in a divorce case is a criminal; that would be to 

render the absurdity of it too obvious, and, moreover, would be hardly 

consistent with the permission to claim damages which is based on a 

different idea. We hover uncertainly between two conceptions of divorce, 

both of them bad, each inconsistent with the other, and neither of them 

capable of being pushed to its logical conclusions. 

 

The result is that if a perfectly virtuous married couple comes forward to 


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